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O P I N I ON  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In antitrust suits, definitions matter.  When a plaintiff 
offers an undisputed definition of the relevant products and 
markets at issue, it is just and reasonable to hold the plaintiff 
to its own definition.  Deborah Heart and Lung Center 
(Deborah) set the parameters for the instant dispute before the 
District Court and subsequently failed to meet its own self-
imposed burden.  Consequently, we will affirm the District 
Court’s entry of judgment in favor of Virtua Health, Inc. 
(Virtua), Virtua Memorial Hospital Burlington County 
(Virtua Memorial), and The Cardiology Group P.A. (CGPA).  
 
I. 
The record in this case is voluminous, and the District 
Court ably laid out the factual circumstances in its opinion.1  
Nevertheless, an abbreviated summary is useful here to 
provide clarity and background.  Deborah is a charity hospital 
located in Browns Mills, New Jersey.  Virtua operates 
multiple hospitals in southern New Jersey, including Virtua 
Memorial.  CGPA was a group of twelve cardiologists who 
practiced in Burlington County, New Jersey.  Cardiac surgery 
could not be performed at Virtua Memorial during the time 
                                                 
1 Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Virtua Health, Inc., No. 11-
1290, 2015 WL 1321674, at *1–6 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2015). 
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period at issue, due to state regulations.  Deborah and Virtua 
competed in the market for medical services. 
 
Deborah identified the “products” over which the 
instant dispute arose as emergency and non-emergency 
advanced cardiac interventional procedures, referred to as 
ACIs.  ACIs include angioplasties and other procedures to 
alleviate cardiac blockages.  If a patient requires an ACI 
procedure and her doctor lacks the expertise or privileges at a 
suitable hospital, the patient must be referred to another 
physician or hospital that is authorized to provide the 
procedures.  In New Jersey, the hospital in which the patient 
is being treated may be prevented by state regulation from 
allowing ACIs to be performed, which would also necessitate 
a transfer to an authorized cardiac hospital.  For non-
emergency ACI procedures, the market at issue, as defined by 
expert testimony submitted by Deborah, consists of five New 
Jersey counties and portions of Philadelphia.  For emergency 
procedures, the market consists of three New Jersey counties.  
Virtua did not challenge Deborah’s market definitions in the 
District Court, nor does it do so here. 
 
Until July 2006, none of CGPA’s physicians could 
perform ACI procedures.  Consequently, CGPA had to refer 
its patients in need of ACIs to other doctors.  Beginning in 
1992, CGPA and Deborah had a relationship that resulted in 
the transfer of numerous ACI patients to Deborah.  This 
relationship was formalized in 1999 through five individual 
contracts, known as physician leases, between ACI-qualified 
cardiologists at Deborah and CGPA.  
 
The ties between CGPA and Deborah began to fray in 
2005, when the doctors at CGPA entered into an exclusive 
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agreement to provide Virtua Memorial with all necessary 
cardiovascular services.  Referrals to Deborah still occurred 
after the agreement was signed, but those referrals dropped 
off significantly, from 627 in 2005 to 60 in the first seven 
months of 2010.  In 2006, CGPA hired a doctor—who had 
previously worked at Deborah—who was capable of 
performing some ACIs, leading CGPA to terminate its 
physician leases with Deborah. 
 
In 2007, CGPA signed a new set of physician leases, 
this time with doctors who worked primarily at Penn 
Presbyterian Hospital in Philadelphia.  Under the new 
agreement, when CGPA patients needed procedures that its 
physicians could not perform or that could not be performed 
at Virtua Memorial, those patients were typically transferred 
to Penn Presbyterian.  Virtua is not mentioned in the new 
contracts, but Deborah alleges that Virtua was an unnamed 
party that participated in the contracts’ negotiation.  Deborah 
also alleges that the goal of the new physician leases was to 
drive Deborah out of business. 
 
Prior to the 2007 contract with Penn Presbyterian, 
approximately eighty-five percent of CGPA’s transfers went 
to Deborah.  After the contract, only thirty percent of 
transfers went to Deborah while seventy percent went to Penn 
Presbyterian.  Deborah asserts that this arrangement 
constituted an illegal restraint on trade and resulted in harm to 
competition because it forced some consumers to obtain ACI 
procedures at Penn Presbyterian when, in a competitive 
market, they would have chosen Deborah.  Deborah also 
alleges that the quality of care at Deborah was superior to the 




Deborah’s amended complaint, filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, asserted that 
CGPA and Virtua violated Section 1 and Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.2  Deborah also filed suit in New Jersey state 
court alleging common law claims for tortious interference 
and unfair competition.  The District Court dismissed the 
Section 2 count from the amended complaint for failure to 
state a claim, a ruling from which Deborah does not appeal.  
Following lengthy discovery, the District Court in its well-
reasoned opinion granted Virtua and CGPA’s motions for 
summary judgment on Deborah’s Section 1 claim, holding 
that Deborah did not introduce sufficient evidence to show 
injury to competition in the designated markets. 
 
II.3 
Resolution of the instant appeal is relatively simple, 
but we write to clarify the burden on an antitrust plaintiff, 
alleging a Section 1 claim in which the plaintiff does not 
assert that the defendants possess market power.  An antitrust 
plaintiff must prove four prongs:  (1) “concerted action by the 
                                                 
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to 15 U.S.C. § 4 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).  We 
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Our review of a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 
F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party, “the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (quoting Thomas 
v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
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defendants,” (2) “anti-competitive effects within the relevant 
product and geographic markets,” (3) that “the concerted 
actions were illegal” and (4) that the plaintiff “was injured as 
a proximate result of the concerted action.”4  Failure to prove 
any one of these prongs is fatal to the Section 1 claim.5  The 
District Court held that Deborah failed to present sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
second prong of this inquiry. 
 
Section 1 claims are evaluated, except in certain 
circumstances inapplicable here, under the “rule of reason.”6  
Deborah alleges that CGPA and Virtua engaged in an illegal 
exclusive dealing arrangement with Penn Presbyterian, 
meaning that Deborah must prove that the arrangement’s 
“‘probable effect’ is to substantially lessen competition in the 
relevant market.”7   
 
As previously mentioned, the definition of the relevant 
markets at issue was not disputed in the District Court.8  The 
relevant market for emergency ACI procedures consisted of 
three New Jersey counties, while the relevant market for non-
                                                 
4 Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
5 Id. 
6 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
7 Id.  
8 J.A. 15; id. at 734:10-14 (Summary Judgment Hearing Tr.: 
“The Court [to Deborah counsel]:  You don’t dispute the 
definition of the market, right?  [Deborah counsel]:  No.  We 
submitted a report, it’s not in dispute, so it is our definition of 
the market.  We agree with that.”). 
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emergency ACI procedures consisted of those three counties, 
plus two more New Jersey counties and parts of Philadelphia.  
Thus, to proceed to trial, Deborah must present sufficient 
evidence of anti-competitive effects “in the relevant market.”9  
Anti-competitive effects for Section 1 purposes can be shown 
in two ways:  by showing “actual anticompetitive effects, 
such as reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration 
in quality of goods and services,” or by showing the 
defendant has “[m]arket power—the ability to raise prices 
above those that would prevail in a competitive market,” 
which is “essentially a surrogate for detrimental effects.”10  
We have noted that “the difficulty of isolating the market 
effects of the challenged conduct” means proof of “actual 
anticompetitive effects,” as opposed to market power, “is 
often impossible to make.”11 
 
Deborah did not, and, indeed, could not argue that 
CGPA and Virtua had sufficient market power as a stand-in 
for proof of actual anticompetitive effects.12  Deborah’s 
expert explained that the relevant market included multiple 
hospitals and hundreds of cardiologists.  At most, CGPA’s 
physicians represented less than eight percent of the 
cardiologists practicing in the relevant market for emergency 
                                                 
9 ZF Meritor, LLC, 696 F.3d at 268. 
10 Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 276 
(3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
11 Id. 
12 Deborah’s attempts to raise a market power argument before us 
in the first instance are inappropriate, given that the failure to raise 
the argument before the District Court waived any opportunity to 
raise it here.  Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Utility Comm’n, 767 
F.3d 335, 352 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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ACI procedures and less than five percent of the cardiologists 
practicing in the relevant market for non-emergency ACI 
procedures.  Thus, Deborah attempted to show actual anti-
competitive effects.  It did so, however, only in reference to a 
small subset of patients, namely, CGPA’s patients and those 
patients who appeared in Virtua Memorial’s emergency 
room.  Deborah argues that, to prevail, it need not show anti-
competitive effects in the market as a whole, so long as it 
shows more than a de minimis effect on competition in the 
market.  Deborah’s argument is foreclosed by our long-
standing precedent. 
 
In Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., we held that, in a rule of 
reason analysis, courts must “examine the competitive 
significance of the alleged restraint to determine whether it 
has an anti-competitive effect on the market and is an 
unreasonable restraint on trade.”13  In that case, we clarified 
that “the relevant geographic market is the area in which a 
potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services 
he or she seeks.”14  Deborah’s expert stated that the “relevant 
geographic market” at issue in this matter are the three- and 
five-county areas in New Jersey and parts of Philadelphia 
previously mentioned.  Yet, all of the arguments on which 
Deborah relies to show anti-competitive effects pertain solely 
to CGPA’s patients and patients entering Virtua Memorial’s 
emergency room.   
 
Such a narrow definition would be improper even if it 
                                                 
13 248 F.3d 131, 145 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Tunis Bros. Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
14 Id. at 147 (quoting Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Med. Serv. Ass’n of 
Pa., 745 F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
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matched with Deborah’s expert’s evaluation of the market at 
issue, which it does not.  In Brader v. Allegheny General 
Hospital, we noted that courts have routinely concluded that 
“absent an allegation that the hospital is the only one serving 
a particular area or offers a unique set of services . . . the 
relevant geographic market” may not be limited “to a single 
hospital.”15  There is no evidence in the record indicating that 
CGPA or Virtua Memorial were sufficiently unique to 
warrant reducing the size of the geographic market to only 
those entities, nor does Deborah make such an attempt here.  
Thus, assuming, arguendo, that Deborah presented sufficient 
evidence that CGPA and Virtua’s agreement caused some 
anti-competitive effects to the patients of those entities, such 
a showing is insufficient to demonstrate the type of anti-
competitive effects on the overall market necessary to prove a 
Section 1 claim. 
 
The United States Supreme Court reached a similar 
conclusion in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. 
Hyde, in which the Court evaluated the “tying” of 
anesthesiology services to surgical services at a New Orleans 
hospital, requiring all patients at the hospital to use a single 
group of anesthesiologists.16  Notably, the restraint in 
Jefferson Parish was even more severe than that present in 
the instant matter.  Here, a significant minority of CGPA and 
Virtua patients were still treated at Deborah after the 
allegedly anti-competitive arrangement, while the Jefferson 
Parish patients were prohibited from being treated by 
anesthesiologists other than those contracted to the hospital in 
                                                 
15 64 F.3d 869, 877–78 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). 




The Supreme Court held that even though the hospital 
in that case required all of its patients to use a single 
anesthesiology provider, the hospital’s actions did not violate 
the Sherman Act because Dr. Hyde, the plaintiff 
anesthesiologist who could not practice at East Jefferson 
Hospital, failed to show anti-competitive effects on “the 
market as a whole,” specifically, the larger New Orleans 
metropolitan area with approximately twenty hospitals.18  In 
Jefferson Parish, the plaintiff presented anecdotal evidence 
that patients were unable to obtain the anesthesiologist of 
their choice, attempting to show actual anti-competitive 
effects based on the restriction of consumer choice at the 
hospital in question.19  The Supreme Court held that such 
evidence was not enough, observing that “[i]t may well be 
true that the contract made it necessary for Dr. Hyde and 
others to practice elsewhere, rather than at East Jefferson.  
But there has been no showing that the market as a whole has 
been affected at all by the contract.”20   
 
Despite Deborah’s efforts to distinguish Jefferson 
Parish, there is no cognizable difference between the anti-
competitive effects found insufficient there and the anti-
competitive effects alleged here.  Deborah makes much of the 
alleged fact that CGPA patients were de facto prevented from 
using the hospital of their choosing because patients did not 
learn of the arrangement between CGPA and Penn 
Presbyterian until it was too late, when the patients were 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 7 n.7, 26–27; 31. 
19 Id. at 29–30. 
20 Id. at 31. 
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already being treated by CGPA physicians.  The same, 
however, was true of the Jefferson Parish patients, where the 
Supreme Court noted that patients with a decided preference 
for one anesthesiology provider over another could, absent 
emergency situations, choose another hospital.21  The Court 
held that the mere fact that consumers were required to make 
a choice to change hospitals in order to obtain the 
anesthesiologist of their choice did not constitute a Sherman 
Act violation.22   
 
We conclude that a plaintiff, who asserts actual anti-
competitive effects to prove a Section 1 violation, must, 
absent evidence of market power possessed by the 
defendants, show anti-competitive effects on the market as a 
whole.  Where, as here, a plaintiff shows effects only on a 
small subset of that market and makes no attempt to show 
broader effects, the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of 
the second prong of the antitrust inquiry.  Deborah staked its 
ground for the instant dispute and its failure to occupy enough 
of that ground is fatal to its claims. 
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                                 
21 See id. at 23–25. 
22 Id. 
